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Using U.S. state-level data between 1993 and 2015, this paper examines whether aggregate 
executive risk-taking incentives are related to future state economic growth. I find evidence that 
an increase in state-level aggregate risk-taking incentives is predictably associated with a lower 
future state economic growth, after controlling for the effect of aggregate pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. This result is robust to a battery of tests conducted to address concerns related to 
correlated omitted variables, reverse causality, and measurement errors. Consistent with the theory 
which posits that lenders’ screening is countercyclical, the negative relation is more pronounced 
during economic expansions and when credit supply is likely to be abundant. Further, subsequent 
total bank loan charge-offs are greater in states with high aggregate risk-taking incentives and a 
high level of credit supply. M&As consummated in states with both high aggregate risk-taking 
incentives and a high level of credit supply perform significantly worse than others.  Finally, an 
examination of possible channels reveals that state-level growth in risk-taking incentives is 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which managers in firms have incentives to maximize firm value is central to 
economic growth. Managerial incentives affect a wide range of corporate decisions including 
financing, investment, hiring and production choices, which in turn affect many aspects of the 
aggregate economy. Providing managers with risk-taking incentives is one of the important tools 
used to motivate risk-averse managers to maximize firm value by encouraging them to fully exploit 
risky, yet valuable investment opportunities (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
However, the rapid increase in the use of risk-taking incentives has coincided with recent 
economic recessions including the dot-com bubble and the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which has 
frequently led policymakers and the media to express concerns that risk-taking incentives 
potentially elicit excessive risk-taking, and to view executive compensation as one of the 
contributing factors of economic downturns. At the height of the Great Recession, the SEC 
proposed a disclosure rule change which would require all publicly traded companies to 
extensively discuss their “compensation policies and their impact on risk taking; stock and option 
awards of executives and directors” (SEC, 2009).1 In its discussion of the motivation for the 
proposal, the SEC states that such changes are necessary “given the role that risk and the adequacy 
of risk oversight have played in the recent market crisis”.2 Further, the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Committee (2011) claimed executive compensation systems contributed to the Great Recession by 
offering big rewards for gains but fewer penalties for losses, stating “systems encouraged the big 
bet – where the payoff on the upside could be huge and the downside limited”. These concerns are 
                                                          
1 Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, July 2009 
2 The proposal eventually led to the implementation of Regulation S-K Item402 in 2009 December. Specifically, the 
rule states : “To the extent that risks arising from the registrant’s compensation policies and practices for its employees 
are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the registrant, discuss the registrant’s policies and practices 




based on the assumption that risk-taking incentives not only matter at the firm-level, but they, in 
the aggregate matter for the economy. Yet there is limited aggregate-level evidence on whether or 
how corporate risk-taking incentives are related to the aggregate economy. In this paper, I examine 
the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and future state economic growth.  
It is unclear whether risk-taking incentives would matter at all for the aggregate economy if the 
determinants and the effects of risk-taking incentives are largely idiosyncratic (i.e. firm-specific) 
and thus are washed out in the aggregate. However, industry and geographic clusters of firms 
sharing similar compensation practices might lead firm-level effects of risk-taking incentives to 
accumulate, generating economic forces big enough to be observed at the aggregate level.  
Even if risk-taking incentives do have an observable association with the aggregate economy, 
it is still unclear whether the relation would be positive or negative. On the one hand, economic 
theory suggests that risk-taking incentives encourage a risk-averse manager to invest in risky, yet 
profitable projects which he/she would otherwise have foregone (among others, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Haugen and Senbet 1981; Smith and Stulz 1985; Agrawal and Mandelker 1987; 
Guay 1999). Prior empirical studies find that risk-taking incentives encourage managers to 
increase investment in research and development (Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2006) and both the 
quantity and quality of innovation (Mao and Zhang 2018). Supporting the theoretical claim that 
risk-taking incentives are one of the important mechanisms used to motivate firm value 
maximization, several studies document that risk-taking incentives are positively associated with 
near-term and long-term stock returns (Cohen, Hall and Viceira 2000; Chen and Ma 2011). These 
findings suggest that for the economy as a whole, managerial risk-taking incentives can positively 




However, theoretical findings also suggest that risk-taking incentives can induce too much risk-
taking that is beyond the optimal level (Lambert 1986; Ju, Leland and Senbet 2002; Landskroner 
and Raviv 2010), which could be value-destroying. Prior empirical evidence documents that one 
of the primary ways that managers respond to risk-taking incentives is increasing leverage 
(Agrawal and Mandelker 1987; Cohen et al. 2000; Coles et al. 2006; Shue and Townsend 2017). 
In fact, Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) find that managers with greater risk-taking incentives increase 
leverage to the extent that they deviate from an optimal capital structure. When many firms are 
overleveraged, the economy is likely to become more vulnerable to financial distress and 
recessions (e.g. Bernanke, Campbell, Whited and Warshawsky 1990). Other studies provide 
evidence that risk-taking incentives are associated with lower investment in fixed assets (Coles et 
al. 2006) and lower future profitability (Brick, Palmon and Wald 2012). To the extent that 
corporate investment and profitability are important determinants of aggregate economic activities 
such as production and employment, these findings suggest that risk-taking incentives can be 
negatively associated with future economic growth.  
One key empirical challenge to examining the relation between risk-taking incentives and the 
aggregate economy is the scarcity of economy-level proxies for risk-taking incentives. The recent 
developments in the macro-accounting literature has shown that firm-level information aggregated 
across individual firms has the potential to be useful to macroeconomists and policy makers in 
measuring and providing timely information about macroeconomic activities (for example, 
Shivakumar 2007; Konchitchki and Patatoukas 2014; Patatoukas 2014; Khan and Ozel 2016; 
Shivakumar and Urcan 2017; Shevlin et al. 2018). Aggregating firm-level information overcomes 
the challenge associated with the scarcity of economy-level proxies, as is the case with risk-taking 
incentives, and is therefore useful in providing aggregate-level evidence. In this paper, I aggregate 
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firm-level risk-taking incentives to construct a proxy for economy-level risk-taking incentives and 
take a step towards providing direct aggregate evidence on the relation between risk-taking 
incentives and state economic outcomes.   
I proxy risk-taking incentives with the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to one-standard 
deviation increase in stock return volatility (vega, hereafter) (Core and Guay 2002). I construct a 
state-level proxy of risk-taking incentives (aggregate vega, hereafter) by aggregating the vegas of 
firms headquartered in each state.  
While the focus of the study is on managerial risk-taking incentives, I also construct state-level 
measure of delta (aggregate delta, hereafter). Delta is measured as the sensitivity of executive 
wealth to stock return and captures the extent to which a compensation policy aligns incentives of 
shareholders with those of executives. Any compensation policy that increases vega also increases 
delta (e.g. providing stock options incentivizes the manager to increase both stock return volatility 
and stock returns). Therefore, controlling for aggregate delta helps better capture the effect of 
excessive risk-taking incentives (i.e. the extent to which executives are incentivized to take risk 
beyond the level that correlates with performance). 
I measure economic growth using the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (FRB)’s state 
coincident index, which is also used in prior studies including Mattoon et al. (2010) and Khan and 
Ozel (2016) to measure the economic activities of states. The state coincident index is a composite 
indicator, constructed using four data series on state-specific economic conditions: nonfarm 
payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage 
and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index. The trend in the index is set equal 
to the trend in the gross domestic product (GDP) of each state. There are at least three advantages 
to using the state coincident index to measure state-specific economic activities. First, the index is 
5 
 
a comprehensive measure of economic activity, as it combines multiple economic indicators. This 
is particularly important since economic growth is characterized as growth in many economic 
activities, rather than in one specific economic activity (Crone and Clay-Matthews 2005). Second, 
the measure is less prone to the effects of temporary fluctuations that are not relevant to the 
underlying trend in economic growth (such as temporary changes in outputs due to natural 
disasters and strikes) and differences in the frequency of data across economic indicators (Crone 
2006; Crone and Clayton-Matthews 2005). Lastly, the index provides a timely indication of 
economic growth, in contrast to most economic indicators that are measured with a considerable 
lag.   
I make several design choices in my baseline specification to mitigate the concern that the 
relation between aggregate vega and future coincident index growth is confounded by correlated 
omitted variables that affect both the state-wide compensation practices and the economic 
condition of the state. First, omitted variables related to state-specific characteristics are of 
particular concern. 3  I employ fixed-effects estimation to exploit the within-state variation in 
aggregate vega to eliminate the effects of state-specific time-invariant omitted variables. Second, 
to control for the effects of time-varying within-state omitted variables, I include proxies of 
concurrent changes in local economic conditions as well as state tax rates. Lastly, I include year-
fixed effects in all specifications to control for the effects of nation-wide macroeconomic 
conditions. 
                                                          
3 For example, if industry concentration simultaneously causes states to experience growth in state-level risk-taking 
incentives and growth in the productivity of workers, then the observed correlation would be spurious. For instance, 
if the high-tech industry provides higher powered incentives than other industries and an industry-specific shock 
unrelated to compensation practices improved the productivity of the high-tech industry, the state of California would 
certainly appear to have experienced stronger growth than other states. However, in this case, the driver behind 




Using U.S. state economies during the period spanning from 1993 to 2015, I find evidence that 
growth in state-level aggregate vega is predictably negatively associated with future state 
coincident index growth, after controlling for the effect of aggregate delta. More specifically, a 
one standard deviation increase in aggregate vega growth is associated with a 17 basis-point 
decline in the subsequent year’s coincident index growth, relative to the average change of other 
states in the same year. Compared to the mean coincident index growth of 2.6%, a 17 basis-point 
decrease represents approximately a 6.5% decrease (= 0.17 / 2.6). This result suggests that the 
portion of vega that is uncorrelated with shareholder-executive incentive alignment negatively 
predicts future state economic conditions. This negative relation is robust to using various 
alternative measures of aggregate risk-taking incentives, and to using aggregate corporate sector 
profitability as an alternative proxy for corporate sector economic growth. 
The above estimate is likely biased if firms in my sample operate in many states, since the effect 
of risk-taking incentives will not be fully captured by the economic activities of the states in which 
their headquarters are located. To address this measurement issue, in a robustness test, I construct 
aggregate risk-taking incentives measures that take into account each firm’s geographic dispersion. 
This results in estimates that are between 7.1% and 11.9% larger than the baseline estimate.  
One concern with my results is reverse causality (or anticipation effects) – that is, risk-taking 
incentives may be adjusted in anticipation of future macroeconomic growth. For example, if the 
anticipation of local economic growth changes the demand for management risk-taking, one would 
observe a correlation between state economic growth and risk-taking incentives, even if risk-taking 
incentives did not have any causal effect on state economy. To mitigate this concern, I perform 
several tests. First, I test the robustness of my results to controlling for the FRB’s prediction of the 
growth rate of the coincident index (i.e. leading index). Second, to examine whether managers 
7 
 
adjust their exposure to risk in anticipation of changing economic conditions and whether this is 
driving the results, I decompose my aggregate vega measure into two parts - the changes in vega 
initiated by the manager and the changes initiated by the board – and examine whether the results 
are driven by the former. Third, I confirm the robustness of my baseline results using an 
instrumental variables approach, where I use state religiosity and the distance-weighted averages 
of aggregate growth in vega in other states as instruments. Lastly, I reverse the regression and 
check if current economic variables significantly predict future aggregate vega changes. These 
tests suggest that anticipation effects are not likely to be the primary driver of the negative relation 
between aggregate risk-taking incentives and future state economic growth. 
What could potentially explain the negative relation between aggregate risk-taking incentives 
and future economic outcomes? I propose that one potential mechanism is the role financial 
systems and institutions play in monitoring and disciplining how the effects of incentives are 
transmitted to the aggregate economy. As noted by Stulz (2004), financial systems, and more 
broadly institutions, affect economic growth through their impact on the efficiency with which 
corporations invest savings and take advantage of valuable investment opportunities. This leads to 
the prediction that the relation likely varies with how well financial systems and institutions 
perform their functions in facilitating economic efficiency. I conduct two sets of analyses to assess 
this prediction. 
First, I motivate my analysis using the theoretical framework in the literature on lending and 
business cycles (see for example, Ruckes 2004; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006; Lisowsky, 
Minnis and Sutherland 2017). Specifically, these studies posit that lenders’ incentives to screen 
out bad quality borrowers/projects are reduced during economic expansions, leading to “lending 
booms”. During lending booms, lenders’ screening and monitoring activities are reduced, causing 
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a greater number of bad quality projects being funded. As long as the effects of risk-taking 
incentives that bring about adverse outcomes are more likely to be transmitted to the economy 
during periods of reduced lender screening/monitoring, the negative relation would be more 
concentrated during good times. Consistent with this prediction, I find evidence that the negative 
association between aggregate risk-taking incentives and future state economic growth manifests 
only during economic expansions, and in states with a larger supply of loans. In addition, the 
negative association is more pronounced in states with a larger increase in housing prices. 
Moreover, I find that subsequent bank loan charge-offs are the highest for high aggregate vega and 
high credit availability states. An examination of post M&A profitability reveals that M&As 
consummated in high aggregate vega and high credit availability states perform significantly more 
negatively compared to other M&As. Overall, these patterns suggest that aggregate vega, alone, 
might not be enough on its own; credit should be abundant to propagate the effects of managerial 
incentives.  
Next, I examine whether the effect of aggregate risk-taking incentives varies with institutional 
factors. I find that the negative effect of aggregate risk-taking incentives on future economic 
growth is more pronounced in low social capital states and states where firms on average have 
poorer corporate governance. These findings suggest that institutional mechanisms that positively 
impact economic efficiency help moderate the negative effect of aggregate risk-taking incentives 
on future economic growth and are consistent with prior studies which claim that better corporate 
governance and higher social capital facilitate economic growth (La Porta et al. 1997; Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Guiso et al. 2004).  
 If risk-taking incentives affect future economic growth through aggregate economic activities 
in the corporate sector, then one would observe a relation between aggregate risk-taking incentives 
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and corporate financing and investment activities measured at the aggregate-level. Moreover, if 
the negative relation between aggregate risk-taking incentives and future economic growth is due 
to the corporate sector indeed increasing risky activities in aggregate, one would observe a positive 
relation between aggregate risk-taking incentives and riskier corporate activities. Consistent with 
these predictions, in the last set of tests, I document that aggregate growth in vega is associated 
with an increase in riskier corporate activities at the aggregate level. In particular, an increase in 
aggregate vega is associated with aggregate growth in leverage and investment in R&D activities 
and a reduction in investment in fixed assets, hiring, and diversification of business activities.  
The paper is closely related to two literatures. First, the results contribute to the recent literature 
which explores macroeconomic implications of firm-level information. Studies in this literature 
have found that aggregate earnings contain information about future inflation and GDP growth 
(see, among others, Shivakumar 2007; Konchitchki and Patatoukas 2014; Patatoukas 2014; 
Shivakumar and Urcan 2017). More recently, studies have shown that other types of firm-level 
data have implications for the aggregate economy. Khan and Ozel (2016) provide evidence that 
banks’ loan portfolios aggregated at the state level are informative about the current and future 
state economic conditions. Shevlin et al. (2018) show that aggregate cash effective tax rates are 
positively associated with future economic growth. Joslin et al. (2016) examine the 
informativeness of audit opinions about long-term economic conditions and find that the aggregate 
frequency of auditors’ going concern opinions is informative about long-term macroeconomic 
conditions. I build on this body of work by providing new evidence that managerial risk-taking 
incentives, an important driver of corporate real decisions, impact the local economy, and 
proposing a potential channel through which the effect takes place. 
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Second, the results are also related to the literature on executive risk-taking incentives. Most 
studies in this literature have focused on the effect of managerial incentives on firm-level outcomes 
such as firm risk (for example, Guay 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Low 2009; Armstrong and 
Vashishtha 2012; Shue and Townsend 2017), investment and financing policies (Agrawal and 
Mandelker 1987; Coles et al. 2006), tax aggressiveness (Rego and Wilson 2012) and financial 
misreporting (Armstrong et al. 2013). The findings collectively suggest that risk-taking incentives 
motivate executives to engage in riskier corporate activities. Despite an extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of risk-taking incentives on corporate-level outcomes, relatively 
little is known about their effects on aggregate economy. Recent studies examine the implications 
of managerial incentives for the Great Recession (for example, Bebchuk et al. 2010; Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz 2011; DeYoung et al. 2013; Bhagat and Bolton 2014); however, the scope of these 
studies is limited to the behavior of financial institutions around the credit crisis.  Importantly, 
while firm-level evidence can provide valuable insight into potential macroeconomic effects, 
externalities and interactions among firms pose a challenge to extrapolating firm-level evidence to 
an aggregate level. I contribute to this literature by directly looking into aggregate evidence on the 
relation between risk-taking incentives and economic activities. 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related literatures and develops empirical 
predictions. Chapter 3 explains the empirical strategy of the paper. Chapter 4 describes the data 







CHAPTER 2: RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS 
2.1 Convexity of payoffs and risk-taking incentives 
Prior theoretical and empirical research shows that a convex payoff structure induces risk-
taking incentives, mitigating the risk-related agency problem between managers and shareholders 
(e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976). A more convex pay function means a manager realizes a greater 
increment in pay as returns get higher. Intuitively, this means that a convex compensation policy 
rewards a manager with incrementally higher payoffs when performance (e.g. stock return) is high 
rather than moderate, and when moderate rather than low, but does not penalize the manager to 
the same extent when performance is extremely low. Such payoff structure thus provides 
incentives for greater risk-taking. Empirically, risk-taking incentives, or the convexity of a 
manager’s payoff function, are typically proxied by the sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to stock 
return volatility (i.e. vega) (e.g. Guay 1999).4  
Many studies provide evidence that equity risk-incentives are associated with greater 
managerial risk-taking, proxied by the volatility of stock returns (among others, see for example, 
Argrawal and Mandelker 1987; Guay 1999; Low 2009; Armstrong and Vashishtha 2012). Studies 
also find that risk-taking incentives are associated with a wide range of riskier corporate policy 
choices. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that risk incentives induced by stock options lead oil 
and gas producers to engage in riskier exploration activities. Coles et al. (2006) show that risk-
taking incentives are associated with risk-increasing financing and investment choices. Rego and 
Wilson (2012) find that risk-taking incentives induce firms to choose more aggressive tax policies. 
Armstrong et al. (2013) provide evidence that risk-taking incentives are positively associated with 
risky financial reporting behavior.  
                                                          
4 For an illustrative example of how the sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to stock return volatility captures the 
convexity of payoffs, or risk-taking incentives, see for example Guay (1999). 
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In the aftermath of the Great Recession, recent studies examine whether the incentive structures 
of financial firms induced financial executives to take excessive risks around the financial crisis. 
While Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) show that the poor performance of banks during the crisis is 
likely due to unforeseen risk, rather than poor incentive structures, Bebchuk et al. (2010) and 
Bhagat and Bolton (2014) provide evidence that the incentives of financial firms are associated 
with excessive risk-taking during the crisis.  
2.2 Risk-taking incentives and macroeconomic growth 
Despite an extensive stream of literature examining the effect of risk-taking incentives on 
corporate level outcomes, relatively little is known about the macroeconomic effects of risk-taking 
incentives.  
Risk-taking incentives might not matter at all for the aggregate economy if the determinants 
and the effects of risk-taking incentives are largely idiosyncratic (i.e. firm-specific) and thus are 
washed out in the aggregate. Indeed, firm-level studies have shown firm-level characteristics such 
as firm size, investment opportunities, cash constraints, and tax effects, and executive-level 
characteristics such as executive age and executive outside wealth are determinants of convex 
incentive schemes (e.g. Yermack 1995; Guay 1999; Core and Guay 1999, 2001). However, 
industry and geographic clusters of firms sharing similar compensation practices might lead firm-
level effects of risk-taking incentives to accumulate and generate economic forces big enough to 
be observed at the aggregate level.   
Even if risk-taking incentives do have an observable association with the aggregate economy, 
it is still unclear whether the relation would be positive or negative.In theory, risk-taking incentives 
reduce risk-related agency problems by encouraging risk-averse managers to undertake all risk-
increasing positive NPV projects (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Haugen and Senbet 1981; Smith 
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and Stulz 1985; Agrawal and Mandelker 1987; Guay 1999). Thus, to the extent that risk-taking 
incentives stimulate fuller exploitation of valuable investment opportunities in an economy, risk-
taking incentives likely facilitate future economic growth. 
Existing empirical evidence also suggests that a positive relation is plausible. For instance, 
Coles et al. (2006) find that risk-taking incentives induce managers to increase investment in 
research and development. Mao and Zhang (2018) show that managerial risk-taking incentives are 
important drivers of firm innovation. Specifically, they document that following the 
implementation of FAS 123R, an option expensing regulation which reduced firms’ usage of risk-
taking incentives, there is a significant reduction in both the quantity and quality of innovative 
activities (measured as the number of patents granted and the number of citations per patent). 
Supporting the theoretical claim that risk-taking incentives are one of the important mechanisms 
used to encourage managers to make firm value-maximizing policy choices, several studies 
document empirical evidence that risk-taking incentives are positively associated with stock 
returns. Low (2009), using the change in antitakeover regulation in Delaware as an exogenous 
variation, provides evidence that the negative stock market reaction to the regime shift and the 
subsequent reduction in firm risk are most concentrated in low vega firms, suggesting that high 
vega values counteract the dampened incentives of managers to take value-increasing risk. Cohen 
et al. (2000) find that the beginning of the year CEO wealth elasticity to stock-return volatility is 
positively associated with current year stock returns. Chen and Ma (2011) find that option-induced 
risk-taking is positively associated with both near term and long-term stock returns. These findings 
suggest that, to the extent that firm innovation and firm-value maximization are important drivers 




In contrast to the argument above, the literature also suggests a negative relationship between 
managerial risk-taking incentives and economic growth. Theoretical studies show that managerial 
risk-taking incentives can induce excessive risk-taking beyond the optimal level, which could be 
value-destroying (Lambert 1986; Ju et al. 2002; Landskroner and Raviv 2010). Prior empirical 
evidence documents that one primary way that managers respond to risk-taking incentives is 
increasing leverage (Agrawal and Mandelker 1987; Cohen et al. 2000; Coles et al. 2006; Shue and 
Townsend 2017). Dong, Wang and Xie (2010) find that risk-taking incentives cause not only 
underlevered firms, but also overlevered firms to take on more debt, evidence which suggests that 
managers with greater risk-taking incentives can be incentivized to increase leverage to the extent 
that they choose a suboptimal capital structure. When many firms are overleveraged, the economy 
is likely to become more vulnerable to financial distress and recessions (e.g. Bernanke et al. 1990). 
Studies also show that risk-taking incentives are associated with lower investment in fixed assets 
(Coles et al. 2006) and lower future profitability (Brick et al. 2012). To the extent that corporate 
investment and profitability are important determinants of production and employment, these 
findings suggest that risk-taking incentives can have a negative impact on economic growth.  
In sum, these firm-level findings together show that risk-taking incentives are associated with 
various risk-increasing corporate policies. However, whether these activities, in sum, are net value-
increasing or value-decreasing either at the firm-level or at a more aggregate level is difficult to 
infer. Moreover, the mixed evidence on the relation between firm-level vega and future 
profitability adds difficulty in extrapolating firm-level evidence to the aggregate level.The paper 
empirically tests the following hypothesis: 




CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
I estimate the following baseline regression to examine the effect of risk-taking incentives on 
state economic growth (Detailed variable descriptions are provided in Table 1).  
∆𝐶𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , =  𝛼 +  𝛽 +  𝛾∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , +  𝛿𝑋 ,  +  𝜀 ,            (1) 
where,  
 The specification exploits the within-state variation in aggregate growth in vega, eliminating 
the effects of state-specific time-invariant omitted variables. In all specifications, year indicator 
variables are included to capture the effects of nation-wide economic conditions. The coefficient 
estimate of γ, thus, represents the change in economic growth rate for a given state s for a one 
percentage point growth rate change in aggregate vega, relative to the average change in the 
coincident index growth rates of all other states in the same year.  
s, t = state and year subscripts, respectively, 
∆CIndexs,t+1 = growth in state economy in year t+1 measured using the 
proportionate changes coincident index, 
∆Vegas,t = state-level growth in vega, calculated as aggregate 
proportionate changes in the vega of the executives of firms 
headquartered in state s in year t, where vega is measured as the 
change in the executive’s wealth for a 0.01 change in the 
standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns 
Xs,t = time-varying state-level control variables, 
αs = state-fixed effects, 
βt = year-fixed effects, 
εs,t+1 = error term. 
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A set of control variables, Xs,t, are included to control for time-varying within-state 
characteristics which potentially simultaneously determine the change in state-level risk taking 
incentives and economic outcomes. Specifically, Xs,t includes: state-level aggregate growth in delta 
(∆Deltas,t), and contemporaneous growths in coincident index, housing price index, total personal 
income and state corporate income tax (∆CIndexs,t, ∆Housing Indexs,t, ∆Personal Incomes,t and 
∆State Taxs,t, respecitvely). 
Delta represents the sensitivity of executive wealth to stock return, also known as “pay-for-
performance sensitivity” or the “slope effect” (Guay 1999). Prior studies find that delta is 
significantly and positively associated with vega and it captures the extent to which the 
compensation policy aligns incentives of shareholders with those of executives by incentivizing 
the executive to increase stock returns5,6 Therefore, I control for ∆Deltas,t, to partial out any effect 
of delta which ∆Vegas,t might otherwise capture. As such, the coefficient estimate of γ, after 
controlling for the effect of delta, helps better capture the effect of excessive risk-taking incentives 
(i.e. the extent to which an executive is incentivized to take risk beyond the level that correlates 
with performance). 
I include one-year lagged dependent variable, ∆CIndexs,t, to mitigate the concern that state-level 
growth in risk-taking incentives reflects firms’ endogenous responses to changing state economic 
conditions. Moreover, the lagged dependent variable helps assure that results are not driven by 
within-state time-series trends in economic growth. Following prior literature, I further include 
                                                          
5 Delta is an important covariate of vega  because any compensation policy choice that affects vega also affects delta 
through the changes in the manager’s portfolio wealth. For example, the value of options is affected by both return 
volatility and stock price. 
6 The direction of the effect of delta on risk-taking behavior is less clear. Many studies suggest that delta increases 
risk aversion by magnifying agents’ exposure to risk (e.g Amihud and Lev 1981; Smith and Stulz 1985; Guay 1999; 
Ross 2004). However, to the extent that higher stock returns require undertaking higher risk, delta can also motivate 
risk-taking (John and John 1993, Coles et al. 2006; Armstrong and Vashishtha 2012). The literature provides evidence 
that vega, on the other hand, is unambiguously associated with the inducement of risk-taking behavior because it 
captures the convexity or the curvature of the relation between a manager’s wealth and stock price. 
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concurrent growth rates in economic indicators available at the state-level (i.e. ∆Housing Indexs,t 
and ∆Personal Incomes,t) to control for changing local conditions not fully captured by the 
coincident index (Khan and Ozel 2016). Finally, I include ∆State Taxs,t based on prior studies 
which find significant associations between taxes and economic growth  (Romer and Romer 2010; 
Shevlin et al. 2018), and between firms’ tax strategies and risk-taking incentives (Rego and Wilson 
2012). To account for potential serial correlation in state economic outcomes within each state, I 



















CHAPTER 4: DATA, SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Data 
4.1.1 Firm-level data 
The data necessary for the construction of state-level vega and delta come from ExecuComp, 
which provides data on compensation for the S&P 1500 companies at the executive level. For each 
firm-year, I calculate vega for each executive using the methodology of Core and Guay (2002). 
Specifically, executive vega is measured as the change in the executive’s wealth for a 0.01 change 
in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. I then calculate the proportionate change in 
his or her vega for each executive. Next, these executive-level growths in vega are aggregated by 
taking equal-weighted averages at the firm-level to construct firm-level growths in vega. Finally, 
I aggregate firm-level growths in vega at the state-level by taking value-weighted averages at the 
state-year level where weights are based on the beginning of the year market value of equity of 
each firm. The choice to value-weight firm-level incentive variables rests on the assumption that 
larger firms potentially have a greater influence on the local economy.7 Put more formally, the 
computation of state-level vega is as follows: 
∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , =  𝑤 , ,
1
𝑛
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , , − 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , ,
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , ,
 
where e indexes executive, i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, n indexes 
the number of executives within firm i, and N indexes the number of firms headquartered in state 
s. wi,s,t indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the beginning of year t 
and is calculated as:  
                                                          
7 Results are robust to equal-weighting, or value-weighting using the beginning of the year total assets, or using the 
vega of the largest firm (i.e. firm with the largest beginning of the year market value of equity) in each state as a proxy 
for state-level risk-taking incentives. 
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𝑤 , , =  
(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐_𝑓 × 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜) ,
∑ (𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐_𝑓 × 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜) ,
 
I calculate state-level delta in the same manner, where executive delta is measured as the change 
in the executive’s wealth for a 1% increase in stock price (Core and Guay 2002).  
I obtain firms’ financial data from Compustat and CRSP. Firms’ geographic dispersion data 
used in a robustness test are obtained from Garcia and Norli (2012).  
4.1.2 State-level economic data 
I use the state-level coincident index series from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
which is also used in prior studies including Mattoon et al. (2010) and Khan and Ozel (2016) to 
measure the economic activities of states. The coincident index is a monthly indicator of state-
level economic conditions. Specifically, the coincident index is constructed by estimating the 
latent factor, or the “common state”, using four state-level economic indicators: nonfarm payroll 
employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and 
salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index. The trend in the index is set equal to 
the trend in the gross domestic product of each state, allowing the index to be interpreted as the 
state-specific “underlying growth rate of the economy” (Crone and Clayton-Matthews 2005).8  
There are at least three advantages to using the state coincident index to measure state-specific 
economic activities. First, the index is a comprehensive measure of economic activity, as it 
combines multiple economic indicators. This is particularly important since economic growth is 
characterized as growth in many economic activities, rather than in one specific economic activity 
(Crone and Clay-Matthews 2005). For example, the official designation of a recession is defined 
as a contraction in many economic indicators including employment, personal income, industrial 
                                                          




production, and real GDP growth (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2008). Second, the 
construction methodology mitigates the effects of temporary fluctuations that are less relevant to 
the underlying trend in economic growth (such as temporary changes in outputs due to natural 
disasters and strikes) and noise stemming from differences in the frequency of data across 
economic indicators (Crone 2006; Crone and Clayton-Matthews 2005).9,10 Lastly, the coincident 
index is a timely indicator of economic growth, in contrast to most economic indicators that are 
measured with a considerable lag.   
I further collect housing price index data from the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and total 
personal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on economic expansion and 
contraction dates are obtained from NBER’s “US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions” 
page. 
4.1.3 State-level institutional data 
My dataset further includes data on state-level institutional characteristics. I use “Commercial 
and Industrial” loans (C&I loans) data from bank-level Call Reports to construct a state-level credit 
supply measure. Data on state religiosity and social capital are collected from the Association of 
Religion Data Archives and the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development at the 
Pennsylvania State University, respectively. I use the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk et al. 2008) 
                                                          
9 State-level economic data are more volatile than nation-level data because state economies are more prone to the 
effects of single events such as hurricanes, plant shutdowns, and temporary fluctuations in outputs resulting from 
sudden changes in product demand (Crone 2006).   
10 The construction methodology of the coincident index assumes that the underlying state of the economy is relatively 
smooth. Therefore, the index adjusts for the trend-cycle and seasonal components by seasonally adjusting the input 
economic data. Because economic indicators, such as average hours worked in manufacturing, are susceptible to 
exceptional factors including unusual weather and work stoppages, the index further adjusts for irregularities in the 
data. Among others these irregularities include severe storms, strikes, discontinuity in data due to the change in 
industry classification scheme, and the intertemporal shift in compensation in anticipation of state tax law changes 
(Crone and Clayton-Matthews 2005). 
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from Lucian Bebchuk’s website to construct aggregate entrenchment scores. Data on distance 
between capital cities are obtained from the Census City Distance Database.  
4.2 Headquarter location 
Compustat provides information on headquarter state location, however, it only reports the 
location of a firm’s current executive office, and therefore does not reflect headquarter state 
relocations. This potentially introduces measurement errors to the aggregate risk-taking incentives 
variable, causing the estimated coefficient to be biased. To remedy this, I use firms’ historical 
headquarter state information obtained from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. 
Using historical headquarter states reclassifies a non-trivial number of firm-year observations in 
my sample. Compustat’s headquarter location information is incorrect for 2,045 firm-years (6.57% 
of total firm-years) affected by 152 relocations. In terms of the magnitude of bias this measurement 
error issue could have potentially caused, I find that using misclassified headquarter information 
attenuates the coefficient on ∆Vegas,t  by 2.4% of the coefficient estimate obtained using the correct 
historical headquarter locations.  
4.3 Sample construction 
I begin with all firm-years at the intersection of Compustat and ExecuComp, with data on 
historical headquarter location available, for the years between 1993 and 2015 (43,190 firm-years). 
I focus on the period beginning 1993 because ExecuComp provides data from 1992, and I require 
one-year lagged values of key variables. Similarly, the period ends in 2015, as my empirical model 
specification requires one-year lead values of economic outcome variables. I restrict my sample to 
firm-years for which the compensation data of five executives are available in ExecuComp. I drop 
executive-firm-years where data for vega and delta are zero or missing. To reduce the influence of 
outliers, I eliminate executive-firm-years with proportionate changes in vega and delta at the 1st 
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and the 99th percentiles. I further require non-missing data on share price (prcc_f) and shares 
outstanding (csho) in Compustat. These screens yield 31,213 firm-years. Finally, I require each 
state-year to have data for at least two firms. This eliminates 88 firm-years and the states of Alaska 
and Wyoming from my sample. The final sample is an unbalanced panel of 1,005 state-years, 
covering 48 states for the 23-year period from 1993 to 2015, and consists of 31,125 firm-years for 
3,357 firms. 
Table 2 reports the composition of the sample used in this study. Panel A shows that the states 
of California, Texas, and New York have the largest number of firms, with 551, 322 and 285 firms 
headquartered in each state, respectively. The state of Montana has the smallest number of firms 
in my sample. Panel B reports the composition of my sample by year. My sample contains an 
average of 1,353 firms each year.  
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
4.4.1 Variation in state-level aggregate risk-taking incentives 
Figure 1 presents the geographic distribution of state-level aggregate growth in risk-taking 
incentives over consecutive four-year periods. To provide comparable depiction of geographic 
variation over time, the same cut off values are used for all six time-periods. Several patterns are 
observed. First, there is a wide geographic variation across states in all time periods. In all time 
periods, the smallest state-level growth ranges between -27% and 0% and the largest state-level 
growth ranges between 55% and 132%. Second, there is also a wide time-series variation. For 
example, California is one of the states with the largest increase in risk-taking incentives during 
the 1997 – 2000 time-period; however, it has a more moderate increase in other time periods. 
Finally, states generally experienced a larger growth in risk-taking incentives in the earlier time 
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periods (1993 – 2004) relative to the later time periods (2005 – 2015). This pattern likely reflects 
the surge in pay-for-performance compensation practices during the 1990s through the early 2000s.  
4.4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 3 Panel A reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in this study. During 
the sample period, the coincident index grew by 2.6% on average across states. Aggregate vega 
increased by an average of 30.6%, while aggregate delta increased by 26.1%.  
Table 3 Panel B presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients among the key 
variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient between growth in aggregate vega and growth in 
coincident index is negative and significant, while the growth in aggregate delta is positively 
correlated with growth in coincident index. Moreover, the significantly positive correlation 
between growth in aggregate vega and aggregate delta indicates that it is important to control for 














CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1 The effect of aggregate risk-taking incentives on state economic growth 
Table 4 presents estimates from the baseline regression. Column (1) shows that vega, on its 
own, is not significantly associated with future coincident index growth. However, Column (2) 
shows that when the effects of delta are controlled for, state-level aggregate growth in vega 
significantly negatively predicts future state coincident index growth. The estimates show that a 
one standard deviation increase in aggregate vega growth is associated with a 17 basis-point (= 
0.393 × (-0.0042)) decrease in coincident index growth in the subsequent year, relative to the 
average change of other states in the same year. Compared to the mean coincident index growth 
of 2.6%, a 17 basis-point decrease represents approximately a 6.5% decrease (= 0.16 / 2.6). 11 
These results suggest that the portion of vega that is uncorrelated with shareholder-executive 
incentive alignment negatively predicts future economic growth. 
While the primary focus of the paper is on the effect of vega, interestingly, the results show that 
aggregate growth in delta has a significant positive association with future economic growth. The 
estimate indicates that a one standard deviation increase in state-level growth in delta is associated 
with a 21 basis-point (= 0.362 × 0.0059) increase in future coincident index growth, which is 
approximately an 8% increase (= 0.21 / 2.6) compared to the mean coincident index growth. As 
previously discussed, whether delta captures net risk aversion or risk-taking incentives is 
ambiguous. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret this positive relation as the effect of risk-aversion 
incentives (or risk-taking incentives to the extent that that higher stock returns require undertaking 
higher risk). I carefully interpret this result as suggesting aggregate growth in delta, regardless of 
                                                          
11  As noted earlier, the coefficient on ∆Risk-taking incentivess,t captures the “convexity effect”. Therefore, an 
equivalent interpretation of these results is that a 39.3 percent average increase in the convexity of the compensation 
policies of firms headquartered in a state is associated with a 17 basis-point decline in the economic growth rate of 
that state in the following year. 
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whether it induces risk-aversion or risk-taking, being associated with an increase in future state 
economic growth.  
One advantage of using the coincident index is that data are available at a monthly frequency. 
Figure 2 plots the cumulative effect of aggregate risk-taking incentives over an 18-month period. 
Specifically, I estimate the baseline regression by increasing the measurement period for the 
dependent variable, ∆CIndexs,t+m, where I vary m from 1 to 18. The figure shows that the 
cumulative effect of aggregate risk-taking incentives monotonically increases and persists up to 
15 months, after which the cumulative effect levels off.12,13  
5.2 Robustness tests of baseline estimation 
5.2.1 Alternative measures of aggregate vega 
In Table 5, I check the robustness of the baseline results to using alternative measures of 
aggregate vega. First, a potential concern with my results is anticipation effects, whereby managers 
alter their exposure to risk in anticipation of future economic conditions. To mitigate this concern, 
I decompose the aggregate vega measure into two parts – 1) changes in vega driven by the board 
through current year compensation (Current vega) and 2) changes driven by the manager 
(Manager-driven vega) – and examine which part primarily drives the relation.14,15 Following 
Gormley et al. (2013), Current vega is constructed by calculating vega using the current year 
                                                          
12 The coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 10 percent or better from m = 3 to m = 18.  
13 In untabulated tests, I also examine the relation between aggregate risk-taking incentives growth and the four 
components of coincident index. State-level aggregate growth in risk-taking incentives is significantly negatively 
associated with future growth in wage and salary disbursements (p = 0.032) and non-farm employment (p = 0.003), 
and positively associated with future unemployment rate growth (p = 0.005). The relation between state-level 
aggregate risk-taking incentives growth and future growth in hours worked in manufacturing is negative, however 
statistically insignificant (p = 0.694).  
14 Gormley et al. (2013) note changes in risk-taking incentives can occur through two channels: 1) changes resulting 
from the adjustment of the options and stocks components of the manager’s current year compensation and 2) changes 
initiated by the manager through the exercise of options or the sale of stocks. 
15 While Current risk-taking incentives can mitigate the concern related to anticipation effects stemming from the 
changes initiated by the manager, a remaining concern is anticipation effects from the changes initiated by the board 
through the adjustment of the options and stocks components of the manager’s current year compensation. In Section 
5.2.4 I further mitigate this concern using an instrumental variables approach. 
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compensation only.16 Manager-driven vega is calculated as the difference between the total change 
in vega and Current vega. Second, the executive compensation structures of financial firms have 
been routinely viewed as creating excessive risk-taking incentives and contributing to economic 
downturns and financial crises (Murphy 2013). To ensure that the risk-taking incentives of 
financial firms are not the sole driver of my results, I re-calculate the aggregate vega using 
nonfinancial firms only. 17  
Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Panel B reproduces the estimation. In Column (1) the 
estimated coefficient on Current vegas,t  is negative and statistically significant, while the 
estimated coefficient on Manager-driven vegas,t is relatively smaller in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant. These results lessen concerns related to potential manager-driven anticipation effects.  
Column (2) shows that the baseline results are robust to using nonfinancial firms only, suggesting 
that the risk-taking incentives of financial firms are unlikely to be the primary driver of my results. 
5.2.2 Using aggregate profitability as a measure of state economic growth  
 One potential way to measure local economic growth, and the growth of the corporate sector, 
in particular, is to use a bottom-up approach from firms’ financials. In Table 6, I check the 
robustness of my baseline results to using alternative measures of economic growth, constructed 
by aggregating firm-level financial data. I create two measures of aggregate profitability – 
aggregate change in return-on-assets and aggregate market-adjusted returns. Both measures 
capture the aggregate profitability of the corporate sector of each state. Detailed variable 
descriptions are provided in Table 1. 
                                                          
16 Current risk-taking incentives is calculated following the methodology used by Gormley et al. (2013) to construct 
their “flow vega”. See Table 1 for a detailed description. 
17 For each alternative measure of aggregate risk-taking incentives, aggregate pay-for-performance sensitivity is also 
re-constructed in the corresponding manner. See Table 1 for variable descriptions. 
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 Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Panel B shows that the results are robust to using these 
alternative measures and provides evidence that aggregate vega growth negatively predicts the 
future profitability of the state’s corporate sector. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase 
in aggregate vega growth is associated with a 391 basis-point (= 0.393 × (-0.0996)) decrease in 
aggregate return-on-assets growth, and an 81 basis-point (= 0.393 × (-0.0206)) decrease in 
aggregate market-adjusted returns.  
5.2.3 Geographic dispersion of firms’ operations 
By using headquarter state as a region of aggregation, I assume that most of firms’ real 
economic activities occur within the state in which their headquarters are located.18 However, to 
the extent that not all of a firm’s risk-taking incentives and economic activities occur in its 
headquarter state, this assumption likely introduces measurement errors to my variable of interest. 
If this is the case, the coefficient estimate obtained from the baseline model is likely biased.  
In this section, I attempt to account for this measurement error issue using firms’ operating 
states data obtained from Garcia and Norli (2012). The authors count the number of different states 
mentioned in firms’ 10-Ks filed with the SEC to proxy for potential states a firm has operations 
in.19 Using this data, I conduct two tests. First, I re-calculate aggregate vega after excluding firms 
that are highly dispersed. Specifically, I remove firms that operate in more than half of all states 
in the U.S. (i.e. state name counts greater than twenty-five). I then re-estimate the baseline 
regression. In the second test, I re-calculate aggregate vega by giving greater weight to firms that 
                                                          
18 Pirinsky and Wang (2006) note that using a firm’s headquarter location to approximate the location of the firm’s 
operations is a reasonable approach given that “corporate headquarters are close to corporate core business activities”. 
Prior studies also examine the extent of the potential measurement errors problem caused by using headquarter 
location. Both Chaney et al. (2012) and Cvijanovic (2014) provide evidence that their assumption that most of firms’ 
real estate assets are located in the same state or MSA as their headquarters yields similar estimated coefficients to 
when more refined identification of firms’ locations is employed.  
19 Firms provide information on their factories, warehouses and sales offices, in their 10-Ks. The authors count state 
names from sections “Item 1: Business”, “Item 2: Properties”, “Item 6: Consolidated Financial Data”, and “Item 7: 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis” of the 10-K filing. 
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are less dispersed. Intuitively, economic activities of a state are likely to be more sensitive to the 
risk-taking incentives of firms whose operations are geographically more concentrated. I replace 
the firm value-based weight (wi,s,t) used for the construction of the baseline aggregate vega with 
new weight, vi,s,t. The computation of vi,s,t is as follows: 
𝑣 , , =  
1
2
(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑓 × 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜) ,





where dispersion is the geographic dispersion measure from Garcia and Norli (2012), measured as 
the number of different states mentioned in the 10-K filing.20 For each of the two tests, aggregate 
delta is also re-constructed in the same manner. 
 The results are presented in Table 7. Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Panel B presents 
results from estimation. Both approaches yield estimated coefficients that are slightly larger in 
magnitude than the baseline estimate, and significant at the 1 percent level.21 With the caveat that 
the correction of measurement error is not likely to be perfect as the geographic dispersion measure 
does not capture the intensity or the types of activities occurring in those operating states, the 
results in Table 7 provide corroborating evidence that the negative relation between aggregate vega 
and future macroeconomic growth is robust to taking into account firms’ geographic dispersion. 
Moreover, the results show that partially correcting for the measurement error issue yields 
coefficient estimates that are 6.7% to 11.9% larger in magnitude, suggesting that the coefficient 
estimate from the baseline model is likely conservative.  
5.2.4 Instrumental variables regression 
                                                          
20 By construction, vi,s,t gives the greatest weight to the largest firm with the highest geographic focus in its headquarter 
state. 
21 Because the data is available from 1994 to 2008, I use the 1994 dispersion data for year 1993 (the first year of my 
sample period) and the 2008 dispersion data for years after 2008. I use the entire sample period to present comparable 
coefficient estimates to the baseline estimates. In untabulated tests, I restrict the sample period to 1994 – 2008. For 
this sample period, using the measures that take geographic dispersion into account yields coefficient estimates that 
are statistically significant and larger in magnitude than the baseline coefficient. 
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 While the baseline empirical specification contains elements that mitigate omitted variable 
concerns, one remaining concern is that boards might modify risk-taking incentives in anticipation 
of future local economic conditions. While plausible, this potential alternative explanation would 
predict a positive, rather than a negative, relation. This is because, as noted by Guay (1999), boards 
are likely to provide executives with more risk-taking incentives “when the potential loss from 
underinvestment in valuable risk-increasing projects is greatest”. Therefore, according to this view, 
there is likely to be an increase in risk-taking incentives when the local economy is anticipated to 
perform well so as to motivate managers to exploit all valuable growth opportunities, and a 
decrease in risk-taking incentives when poor local economic conditions are expected.  
However, I attempt to further address this concern using an instrumental variables regression. 
I use two instruments. First, I use the change in state religiosity, where religiosity is measured as 
the number of religious adherents divided by the total population in the state. This variable is 
motivated by Adhikari and Agrawal (2016), who suggest that a firm’s risk-taking incentives are 
associated with the religiosity of the region in which the firm is located. 22  Therefore, while 
religiosity is likely to be correlated with the aggregate vega of a state, it is unlikely to have a direct 
impact on the state’s macroeconomic growth. The second instrument is the distance-weighted 
average of vega growth in other states within the same year. Specifically, I weight other states’ 
aggregate vega growth by the inverse of the log of the distance between the two states’ capital 
cities. Weighting by the inverse of distance gives greater weight to the vega changes of nearby 
states. While state competition for business (Fisher and Peters, 1998) and managerial talent should 
cause a state’s aggregate vega to be affected by nearby states, this should not have direct effects 
                                                          
22 Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) find that banks located in more religious counties grant less risk-taking incentives. 
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on the focal state’s economic growth, controlling for the effect of nation-wide macroeconomic 
conditions. Table 1 contains details on the construction of the two instruments.  
Table 8 reports results from the instrumental variables regressions. Column (1) reports the 
coefficient estimates from the first-stage regression. Both instruments are significantly correlated 
with aggregate vega growth. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic is 26.96 (p-value = < 0.001), 
strongly rejecting the null that the model is under-identified. Further, Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-
statistic is 205.78 which is greater than the 10% Stock-Yogo (2005) weak identification test critical 
value of 19.93, strongly rejecting the null that the instruments are weakly identifying. Lastly, the 
Hansen J overidentification test statistic of 0.657 fails to reject the null that the instruments are 
valid.23 Overall, these results provide statistical validation for the instruments. 
 In Column (2), I use the instrumented aggregate vega growth and re-estimate the baseline 
regression. The estimated coefficient is -0.0031, which is smaller in magnitude than the coefficient 
estimate reported in Table 4 and is statistically significant (p-value = 0.066). The evidence in Table 
8 suggests that the negative relation between aggregate vega and future economic growth is robust 
to using instrumental variables estimation.  
5.2.5 Controlling for forecasted economic growth 
 In Table 9, I examine the robustness of my results to controlling for the FRB’s prediction of the 
growth rate of the coincident index (i.e. leading index). The leading index is published by the FRB 
as a predictor of the six-month growth rate of the coincident index and it is constructed using a 
model that incorporates the coincident index, and other variables that lead the economy (state-
level housing permits, state initial unemployment insurance claims, delivery times from the 
Institute for Supply Management manufacturing survey, and the interest rate spread between the 
                                                          
23 Specifically, the Hansen J overidentification test tests the joint null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
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10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill). Including the leading index helps control 
for the anticipation effect to the extent that risk-taking incentives are modified in anticipation of 
the future macroeconomic growth that is predictable at t. Table 9 shows that the coefficient on 
Leading Index is positive and significant, suggesting that it strongly predicts the subsequent year’s 
coincident index growth. The coefficient on aggregate vega growth is -0.0039 and is statistically 
significant (p=0.003), suggesting that a large part of the relation comes from the portion of vega 
that is not correlated with forecasted economic growth. 
5.3 Mechanism  
 What could be a plausible explanation for this negative relation between aggregate vega and 
future state coincident index growth? I propose that one potential mechanism is the role financial 
systems and institutions play in monitoring and disciplining how the effects of incentives are 
transmitted to the aggregate economy. As noted by Stulz (2004), financial systems, and more 
broadly institutions, affect economic growth through their impact on the efficiency with which 
corporations invest savings and take advantage of valuable investment opportunities. In this 
section, I investigate whether the effect of aggregate risk-taking incentives varies with how well 
financial systems and institutions perform their functions in facilitating economic efficiency. 
5.3.1 The role of credit supply and economic cycle 
I motivate my analysis using the theoretical framework in the literature on lending and business 
cycles. Prior studies show that while lenders play an important role in screening out these 
excessively risky borrowers and projects, they are not always motivated or able to do so (see for 
example, Ruckes 2004; Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006; Lisowsky et al. 2017). Specifically, these 
studies propose that during the expansionary phase, the pool of profitable projects and the 
proportion of high-quality borrowers increase, reducing the marginal benefit that banks obtain 
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from conducting screening activities. Further exacerbated by the heightened competition among 
banks, lending policies are relaxed during good times, leading to “lending booms”. Collectively, 
these studies posit that during economic and thus credit expansions, lenders’ screening and 
monitoring activities are reduced, causing a greater number of bad quality borrowers/projects 
being funded.  
Table 10 presents coefficient estimates from regressions on subsamples partitioned on proxies 
of economic cycle and credit supply. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 examine whether the 
negative effect of aggregate vega is differentially stronger in the expansionary phase of an 
economic cycle relative to the contractionary phase. I define expansionary and contractionary 
phases using the NBER dates for expansions and contractions. Column (1) presents the results for 
the expansionary years (1993-2000, 2002-2007, and 2010-2015), and column (2) presents the 
results for the contractionary years (2001, 2008, and 2009).  The results show that the negative 
effect of aggregate vega on future state coincident index growth is only evidenced during the 
expansionary phase. Specifically, column (1) shows that during economic expansion, an increase 
in vega is associated with a 17 basis-point (= 0.393 × (-0.0042)) decline in coincident index growth. 
In column (2), the coefficient for aggregate vega is positive and statistically insignificant. 
In columns (3) and (4), I present the results of estimation where I divide the sample into two 
groups on the amount of credit supply, which I proxy using commercial and industrial loans 
supplied within the state in year t-1.24 Column (3) shows state-level growth in vega is significantly 
negatively associated with future state coincident index growth in states with relatively large 
amounts of loans supplied to the business sector; specifically, a one standard deviation increase in 
                                                          
24 Specifically, I measure credit supplied in year t-1 as net change in total commercial and industrial loans outstanding 
(balance sheet item) from the end of year t-2 to t-1.  I use year t-1 loan supply, instead of year t, to deal with the 
concern that aggregate risk-taking incentives, in turn, likely affect credit supply, given prior studies which find risk-
taking incentives increase firm leverage.  
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aggregate vega growth is followed by a 28 basis-point (=0.393 × (-0.0072)) decline in coincident 
index growth in these states. Column (4) shows that the effect of aggregate vega is economically 
small and statistically insignificant in states with relatively small loan supply.  
One concern with using the NBER recession dates for my sample period is that there are only 
two recession periods – 2001 and 2008 – 2009. As a result, only three years are classified as 
economic contraction. To complement the evidence on economic cycle presented in columns (1) 
and (2), I examine whether the association is stronger in states with relatively large housing price 
level growth in year t-1 compared to other states. Partitioning on housing price is motivated by the 
theoretical framework that an increase in borrower net worth, and in particular, in this case the 
collateral value of assets, leads to a reduction in the costs of external financing of investments and 
easier access to credit (Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Bernanke et al. 
1999) and weakened incentives for banks to screen the quality of projects (Manove et al. 2001). 
The results presented in columns (5) and (6) suggest that the negative effect of aggregate vega is 
stronger in states which experienced relatively large growth in housing prices. Column (5) shows 
that the coincident index growth declines by 24 basis points (= 0.393 × (-0.0061)) for a one 
standard deviation increase in aggregate vega growth in states with larger growth in housing prices. 
In contrast, column (6) shows the effect is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant in 
states with lower growth in housing prices.  
To provide further evidence on the importance of credit availability in the relation between vega 
and economic conditions, next I examine subsequent bank loan charge-offs and post-M&A 
profitability. First, Figure 3 shows the total amount of bank loan charge-offs in year t+1. I split my 
state-year observations into four groups based on the level of state-level aggregate vega growth 
and the amount of C&I loans outstanding in year t. Both in dollar and percentage terms, the total 
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state-level loan charge-offs are the highest when both aggregate vega growth and credit availability 
were high. Second, Figure 4 tracks stock returns after M&A deals. Similar to Figure 3, M&A deals 
are split into four subgroups based on the level of state-level aggregate vega growth and the amount 
of C&I loans outstanding in the year the M&A was consummated. The figure shows that M&As 
that were consummated in states with both high aggregate vega growth and credit availability 
subsequently perform significantly more negatively than M&As in other three groups.  
These patterns collectively suggest that the relation between aggregate risk-taking incentives 
and state economic conditions varies with the availability of funds in the economy in such a way 
that the negative relation is stronger when credit supply is more abundant and lending policies are 
more likely to be lenient.   
5.3.2 The role of corporate governance and social capital 
An extensive body of work examines the role of institutions in fostering economic growth. A 
widely held view is that better investor protection positively impacts economic growth through 
various channels, including well-developed capital markets (La Porta et al. 1997), better risk 
sharing between the agent and the principal which increases the demand for capital at the economy 
level (Castro et al. 2004) and distribution of control over capital resources (Morck et al. 2005). 
Likewise, high social capital is generally viewed as having a positive impact on economic 
growth by reducing economic inefficiencies. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) note that in 
high social capital societies, fewer resources are lost through expropriation, monitoring, and 
inefficient workings of institutions, while more resources are allocated to investment, innovation, 
and accumulation of human capital.  Focusing specifically on the role of social capital on financial 
development, Guiso et al. (2004) show that households in social capital-intensive communities are 
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more likely to invest in riskier assets (i.e. stock) than in safe assets (i.e. cash) and have better access 
to credit. 
Given these findings emphasizing the role of corporate governance and social capital in 
positively impacting the efficiency of economic transactions and resource allocation, it is of 
empirical question whether the adverse effect of risk-taking incentives would be reduced in states 
with better corporate governance and higher social capital.  
Table 11 presents coefficient estimates from regressions on subsamples split on corporate 
governance and social capital index. Corporate governance is proxied by the Entrenchment index 
(E index) constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2008).25 I construct a state-level measure by aggregating 
the firm-level E index across firms in each state.26 Social capital is measured using the social 
capital index provided by the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development at the 
Pennsylvania State University.27 I aggregate the county-level data at the state-level to construct a 
state-level social capital measure.28 The data are available for 1990, 1997, 2005, 2009 and 2014. 
Therefore, following Hasan et al. (2017), I interpolate the data for the missing years. Table 1 
contains details on the construction of these measures. 
                                                          
25 Entrenchment index (E index), as constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2008), measures the extent to which a firm has 
entrenching provisions. Specifically, each firm is given a score from 0 to 6 based on the number of provisions that 
limit shareholder power - staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, 
and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. 
26 The firm-level E index data are available for years between 1990 and 2006. Therefore, the sample used for this 
analysis is limited to these years. 
27 Social capital is calculated as the first principal component from a principal component analysis of four factors: 
Pvote (percentage of voters who voted in the last presidential election), Respn (response rate to the Census Bureau’s 
decennial census), Nccs (number of non-profit organizations), and Assn (total number of social organizations). Assn 
includes sports clubs; civic and social associations; religious, political, professional and labor organizations; and 
business associations. Prior studies using this data note that Pvote and Respn likely capture individual behaviors 
regarding civic responsibilities, while Nccs and Assn capture civic norms of social networks (Hasan et al. 2017). 
28 To aggregate the county-level data at the state-level, I first aggregate each of the four county-level factors to the 
state-level and linearly interpolate the data for the missing years. I then obtain the first principal component from a 
principal analysis of the four state-level factors.  
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Columns (1) and (2) show that the decline in coincident index growth is larger for states in 
which executives on-average are more entrenched. The coefficient for states in which executives 
are on-average less entrenched is negative, however statistically insignificant. Columns (3) and (4) 
demonstrate that while the subsample of states with low social capital show that future economic 
growth is sensitive to aggregate vega growth, social capital-intensive states do not show such 
sensitivity. Overall, the results presented in Table 11 suggest that institutional mechanisms which 
positively impact economic efficiency may help moderate the negative relation between vega and 
economic growth. These findings are also consistent with prior studies which emphasize the 
importance of institutional factors such as corporate governance and social capital in facilitating 
economic growth. 
5.4 Aggregate corporate activities 
 If aggregate vega has a predictive ability for future state economic conditions by providing 
information about aggregate economic activities in the corporate sector, then one would observe a 
relation between aggregate vega and corporate financing and investment activities measured at the 
aggregate-level. Moreover, if the negative relation between aggregate vega and future economic 
growth is due to the corporate sector indeed increasing risky activities in aggregate, one would 
observe a positive relation between aggregate vega and riskier corporate activities. In this section, 
I assess these predictions. 
 Prior studies that examine the effect of vega on corporate level outcomes provide evidence that 
higher vega motivates managers to engage in riskier corporate policies (e.g. Agrawal and 
Mandelker 1987; Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006).29 These studies find that vega 
encourages firms to increase leverage and re-allocate resources from less risky capital expenditures 
                                                          
29 See Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of prior studies in this line of literature. 
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to riskier R&D investments. Further, the literature shows that vega can affect firms’ decision to 
focus on a small number of segments or diversify operating risks across a large number of segments. 
While not explicitly examined in prior studies, these corporate decisions that entail plant 
expansions and shutoffs, acquisitions of businesses, and re-allocation of resources, should 
inevitably affect firms’ hiring or layoff decisions as well. In this section, I explore whether 
aggregate vega is associated with an increase in riskier corporate activities at the state-level. While 
corporate activities measured directly at the macroeconomic level would best suit the purpose of 
the analysis, unfortunately data limitations prevent direct measurement of aggregate corporate 
activities at the macroeconomic level. As such, I construct aggregate measures of corporate 
activities using firms’ financial data. 
 Table 12 provides evidence. I examine five types of corporate activities: leverage, investment 
in fixed assets, R&D intensity, hiring decisions measured as the net change in the number of 
employees, and segment diversification choices. I construct aggregate level measures of these 
variables by first calculating proportionate changes at the firm-level and then computing the size-
weighted averages of the variables. Detailed variable descriptions are provided in Table 1. 
 Panel A reports descriptive statistics. Panel B presents the coefficient estimates from estimating 
the baseline model where the dependent variable is replaced alternatively with aggregate corporate 
policy variables. The results in this table provide evidence that growth in aggregate vega is 
associated with riskier corporate activities at the aggregate level. Specifically, aggregate growth 
in vega is positively associated with aggregate growth in leverage. Further, there is an increase in 
investment in R&D activities, a decline in investment in fixed assets and net hiring, and an increase 
in segment focus.  
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 While the analysis presented in this section has limitations in that corporate policies cannot be 
directly measured at the macroeconomic level, the results presented in Table 12 provide evidence 
consistent with the prediction that aggregate vega has a predictive ability for state economic 
conditions by serving as a leading indicator of these corporate activities.  
5.5 Additional analyses 
5.5.1 Pre- and post- 2006 
 The landscape of executive compensation practices of years prior to 2006 differs significantly 
from those after 2006. The post-2006 period coincides with events such as FAS 123R (option 
expensing rule change), the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and the overhaul of executive 
compensation disclosure rules. These events commonly represent forces that potentially dampened 
the usage of risk-taking incentives either through an accounting rule change or increased public 
scrutiny over the provision of excessive incentives to executives. In this section, I explore the 
relation between aggregate vega and economic conditions around this time period. Figure 5 plots 
the coefficient estimates from the main regression for time periods before and after 2006. The 
figure shows that aggregate vega strongly negatively predicts the subsequent year’s economic 
conditions during the pre-2006 period (2003 – 2006); however, the coefficient estimate is positive 
or less negative in the post-FAS 123R period (2007-2010).  
5.5.2 Dispersion and skewness of incentives 
In this section, I explore whether other moments of the distribution of managerial incentives 
provide incremental information about future state economic conditions. Specifically, I examine 
the effects of the dispersion and the skewness of the distribution of both vega and delta incentives. 
Table 13 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) show that while the skewness of the distribution 
of vega does not contain incremental information about future state economic conditions, the 
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skewness of delta does. Specifically, more negatively skewed delta (i.e. fatter right-side tail or a 
greater number of firms with large growth in delta) positively predicts future coincident index 
growth. Columns (3) and (4) show that the dispersions of vega and delta distributions do not on 
their own provide information about future state economic conditions. However, aggregate delta 
with lower dispersion more positively predicts future economic conditions, than aggregate delta 
with higher dispersion. In both columns (2) and (4), the main measures of aggregate vega and delta 
remain statistically significant. 
5.5.3 Reverse regression 
 Throughout the study, I conduct several tests to confirm that anticipation effects are not the 
primary driver of the observed relation between aggregate vega and future state economic 
outcomes. As a final check, I reverse my main regression and examine whether current economic 
conditions predict future aggregate changes in vega. Results in Table 14 show that current 













CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 This paper presents new evidence on the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and 
future state economic conditions. Using U.S. state economies, I examine whether state-level 
aggregate risk-taking incentives are related to future state economic growth. The primary finding 
is that an increase in state-level aggregate vega is associated with a decline in future state economic 
growth, after controlling for the effect of aggregate delta. I suggest that a potential intermediate 
mechanism for this negative relation is the role financial systems and institutions play in 
monitoring and disciplining how the effects of incentives are transmitted to the aggregate economy. 
Theoretical research posits that lenders’ screening is countercyclical. As such, more of lower 
quality projects are likely to be funded during lending booms. Consistent with such theory, I 
provide evidence that the negative relation is more pronounced when credit supply is likely to be 
abundant and lending policies lenient. Moreover, total bank commercial and industrial loans 
charge-offs are subsequently greatest in states with high aggregate risk-taking incentives and high 
credit availability. I also find evidence that in these states, M&As that subsequently perform poorly 
are funded. These patterns, together with my main results, are consistent with the interpretation 
that excessive risk-taking incentives (i.e. the extent to which executives are incentivized to take 
risk beyond the level that correlates with shareholder-executive incentive alignment) negatively 
predict future economic conditions, and that conditions that make excessive risk-taking more likely 
(i.e. credit booms) help propagate the effects of managerial incentives. I further document that the 
negative relation between risk-taking incentives and future state economic growth is muted in 
states with higher social capital and states in which firms on average have better corporate 
governance. Finally, an examination of aggregate corporate activities reveals that state-level 
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growth in risk-taking incentives is associated with an increase in riskier corporate activities at the 

























Figure 1: Variation in state-level executive risk-taking incentives, 1993 – 2015 
This figure presents the time-series and geographic variation in state-level growth in executive risk-taking 
incentives. State-level growth in executive risk-taking incentives is calculated by aggregating proportionate changes 
in the vegas of the executives of firms headquartered in the respective state. The cutoff values are 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 
25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50 and 55 percent average growth over the given time-period. Lighter colors represent smaller 



































































































Figure 2: Cumulative effect of aggregate vega over time 
This figure presents the cumulative effect of aggregate vega on state economic growth over time. Specifically, the 
figure plots the coefficient estimate, γ, from the following regression: 
∆𝐶𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 , =  𝛼 + 𝛽 +  𝛾∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , +  𝛿𝑋 ,  +  𝜀 ,   
,where s,t,and m index state, year, and month, respectively. ∆𝐶𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 ,  is coincident index growth of state s, from t to 
t+m, where m takes the value from1 to 18; ∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 ,  is aggregate vega growth of state s, in t; 𝑋 ,  is a vector of control 
variables (see Eq. 1); 𝛼  is state-fixed effects; 𝛽 is year-fixed effects; and 𝜀 ,   is the error term. The x-axis represents 


























Figure 3: Bank loan charge-offs 
This figure presents state-level total commercial and industrial (C&I) loan charge offs in year t+1 for four subsamples 
divided based on year t state-level risk-taking incentives and C&I loans. High (Low) risk-taking incentives are defined 
as above (below) median aggregate growth in vega in year t. High (Low) C&I loans are defined as above (below) 





Figure 4: Post-M&A stock returns 
This figure presents market-adjusted average post-M&A stock returns for four subsamples of M&A deals divided 
based on the consummation year (t) state-level risk-taking incentives and C&I loans. High (Low) risk-taking 
incentives are defined as above (below) median aggregate growth in vega in year t. High (Low) C&I loans are defined 


























Figure 5: Relation pre- and post- 2006 
This figure plots the coefficient estimates from regressing Eq (1) for years around 2006. The pre- period includes 








Table 1: Variable definitions and data sources 
This table describes variable definitions and data sources. 
 
Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Tables 3 - 14  
∆CIndexs,t ∆CIndexs,t is the growth in the Federal Reserve Bank's coincident index, calculated as (CIndexs,t – 
CIndexs,t-1) / CIndexs,t-1 where CIndexs,t is the coincident index for state s, as of the last month of 
year t. Data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
∆Vegas,t ∆Vegas,t is defined as the aggregate proportionate changes in the vegas of executives of firms 
headquartered in state s, and is calculated as 
∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , =  𝑤 , ,
1
𝑛
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , , − 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , ,
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , ,
 
where e indexes executive, i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, n indexes the 
number of executives within firm i, and N indexes the number of firms headquartered in state s. 
𝑤 , ,  indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the beginning of year t and 
is calculated as   
𝑤 , , =  
(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑓 × 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜) ,
∑ (𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑓 × 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜) ,
 
I require each firm to have the data of five executives in ExecuComp. Vegae,i,s,t is defined as the 
dollar change in the executive's wealth for a 0.01 increase in the standard deviation of the firm's 
stock returns and is calculated using the methodology of Core and Guay (2002). Executives' wealth 
is calculated from the total portfolio of stock and options. Data are obtained from ExecuComp. 
∆Deltas,t ∆Deltas,t is defined as the aggregate proportionate changes in the delta of executives of firms 
headquartered in state s, and is calculated as 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , =  𝑤 , ,
1
𝑛
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , , , − 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , , ,
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , , ,
 
where e indexes executive, i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, n indexes the 
number of executives within firm i, and N indexes the number of firms headquartered in state s. 
𝑤 , ,  indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the beginning of year t (see 
the definition of ∆Vegas,t above for the formula for 𝑤 , , ). I require each firm to have the data of 
five executives in ExecuComp. Deltae,i,s,t is defined as the dollar change in the executive's wealth 
for a 1 percent increase in stock price and is calculated using the methodology of Core and Guay 
(2002). Executives' wealth is calculated from the total portfolio of stocks and options. Data are 
obtained from ExecuComp. 
∆Housing Indexs,t ∆Housing Indexs,t is the growth in seasonally adjusted housing price index, calculated as (Housing 
Indexs,t - Housing Indexs,t-1) / Housing Indexs,t-1, where Housing Indexs,t is seasonally adjusted 
housing price index for state s, as of the last quarter of year t. Data are obtained from the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency. 
∆Personal Incomes,t ∆Personal Incomes,t is the growth in total personal income, calculated as (Personal Incomes,t - 
Personal Incomes,t-1) / Personal Incomes,t-1, where Personal Incomes,t is the total personal income 
for state s, as of the last quarter of year t. Data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
∆State Taxs,t ∆State Taxs,t is the growth in state tax rate, calculated as (State Taxs,t – State Taxs,t-1) / State Taxs,t-
1, where State Taxs,t is the state corporate income tax rate for state s, in year t. When there are more 
than one tax bracket, the tax rate for the top bracket is used. Data are obtained from the Tax 
Foundation (http://www.taxfoundation.org). 
Table 5  
Current vegas,t Current vegas,t is defined as the aggregate current vega of executives of firms headquartered in state 
s, and is calculated as 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎 , =  𝑤 , ,
1
𝑛
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , ,  
where e indexes executive, i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, n indexes the 
number of executives within firm i, N indexes the number of firms headquartered in state s. 𝑤 , ,  
indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the beginning of year t (see the 
definition of ∆Vegas,t above for the formula for 𝑤 , , ).  Following the construction of “flow vega” 
in Gormley et al. (2013), the current vega of an executive is calculated using the same methodology 
as vega, but using only options granted in a given year. Data are obtained from ExecuComp. 
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Table 1 (cont) 
Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Current deltas,t Current deltas,t is defined as the aggregate current delta of executives of firms headquartered in 
state s, and is calculated as 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , =  𝑤 , ,
1
𝑛
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , , ,  
where e indexes executive, i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, n indexes the 
number of executives within firm i, N indexes the number of firms headquartered in state s. 𝑤 , ,  
indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the beginning of year t (see the 
definition of ∆Vegas,t above for the formula for 𝑤 , , ). Following the construction of “flow delta” 
in Gormley et al. (2013), the current delta of an executive is calculated using the same methodology 
as delta, but using only stocks and options granted in a given year. Data are obtained from 
ExecuComp. 
Manager-driven vegas,t Manager-driven vegas,t is calculated as the difference between the total change in vega and Current 
vegas,t. Data are obtained from ExecuComp. 
Manager-driven deltas,t Manager-driven deltas,t is calculated as the difference between the total change in delta and Current 
deltas,t. Data are obtained from ExecuComp. 
∆Vegas,t 
(Nonfinancial firms) 
∆Vegas,t (Nonfinancial firms) is defined as the aggregate proportionate changes in the vegas of 
executives of nonfinancial firms (SIC codes other than 6000-6999) headquartered in state s. Data 
are obtained from ExecuComp. 
∆Deltas,t 
(Nonfinancial firms) 
∆Deltas,t (Nonfinancial firms) is defined as the aggregate proportionate changes in the deltas of 
executives of nonfinancial firms (SIC codes other than 6000-6999) headquartered in state s. Data 
are obtained from ExecuComp. 
Table 6  
Agg∆ROAs,t Agg∆ROAs,t is defined as the aggregate changes in return-on-assets (ROA) of firms headquartered 
in state s, and is calculated as 
𝐴𝑔𝑔∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 , = 𝑤 , ,
𝑅𝑂𝐴 , , − 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , ,
|𝑅𝑂𝐴 , , |
 
where i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, N indexes the number of firms 
headquartered in state s.  𝑤 , ,  indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at 
the beginning of year t (see the definition of ∆Vegas,t above for the formula for 𝑤 , , ).  ROAi,s,t is 
calculated as ib / at. Data are obtained from Compustat. 
AggRETs,t AggRETs,t is defined as the aggregate market-adjusted return of firms headquartered in state s, and 
is calculated as 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑅𝐸𝑇 , = 𝑤 , , 𝑅𝐸𝑇 , ,  
where i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, N indexes the number of firms 
headquartered in state s.  𝑤 , ,  indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at 
the beginning of year t (see the definition of ∆Vegas,t above for the formula for 𝑤 , , ).  RETi,s,t is 
the buy-and-hold market adjusted return. Data are obtained from CRSP. 
Table 7  
∆Vega_geofocuseds,t ∆Vega_geofocuseds,t is defined as the aggregate proportionate changes in the vegas of executives 
of firms headquartered in state s, calculated after eliminating firms with dispersion greater than 
twenty-five, where  dispersion is the geographic dispersion measure from Garcia and Norli (2012) 
constructed as the number of different states mentioned in the 10-K filing. Data are obtained from 
Garcia and Norli (2012). 
∆Delta_geofocuseds,t ∆Delta_geofocuseds,t is defined as the aggregate proportionate changes in the deltas of executives 
of firms headquartered in state s, calculated after eliminating firms with dispersion greater than 
twenty-five, where  dispersion is the geographic dispersion measure from Garcia and Norli (2012) 
constructed as the number of different states mentioned in the 10-K filing. Data are obtained from 







Table 1 (cont) 
Variable Definition and Data Sources 
∆Vega_wgeofocuseds,t ∆Vega_wgeofocuseds,t is defined as geographic dispersion-weighted aggregate proportionate 
changes in the vegas of executives of firms headquartered in state s, calculated as  
∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎_𝑤𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 , =  𝑣 , ,
1
𝑛
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , , − 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , ,
𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 , , ,
 
where e indexes executive, i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, n indexes the 
number of executives within firm i, N indexes the number of firms headquartered in state s. 𝑣 , ,  
indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the beginning of year t and the 
inverse of geographic dispersion, and is calculated as   
𝑣 , , =  
1
2
(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑓 × 𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑜) ,





, where dispersion is the geographic dispersion measure from Garcia and Norli (2012) constructed 
as the number of different states mentioned in the 10-K filing. Data are obtained from Garcia and 
Norli (2012). 
∆Delta_wgeofocuseds,t ∆Delta_wgeofocuseds,t is defined as geographic dispersion-weighted aggregate proportionate 
changes in the deltas of executives of firms headquartered in state s, calculated as 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎_𝑤𝑔𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 , =  𝑣 , ,
1
𝑛
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , , , − 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , , ,
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎 , , ,
 
where e indexes executive, i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year, n indexes the 
number of executives within firm i, N indexes the number of firms headquartered in state s. 𝑣 , ,  
indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the beginning of year t and the 
inverse of geographic dispersion (see the definition of ∆Vega_wgeofocuseds,t above for the formula 
for 𝑣 , , ). Data are obtained from Garcia and Norli (2012). 
Table 8  
∆Religiositys,t ∆Religiositys,t is defined as the change in religiosity for state s. Religiosity for state s is calculated 
as the number of religious adherents (totadh as reported by the ARDA) in the state divided by the 
total population in the state (totpop as reported by the ARDA). Surveys on religiosity at the state 
level are available for 1990, 2000 and 2010. I linearly interpolate the data for the missing years. 
Data are obtained from the Association of Religion Data Archives. 
DW∆Vega_others,t DW∆Vega_others,t is defined as distance-weighted ∆Vega of all states other than state s in year t,  
and is calculated as 
𝐷𝑊∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎_𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 , =  𝑑𝑤 ∆𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎 ,  
where s indexes state, -s indexes states other than s, t indexes year, and S indexes the number of 
states in year t.  𝑑𝑤 indexes weight computed as the inverse of the log of the distance between 
the capital cities of state s and state -s. Data on distance are obtained from NBER's Census City 
Distance Database. 
Table 9  
Leading Indexi,t The leading index is published by the FRB as a predictor of the six-month growth rate of the 
coincident index and it is constructed using a model that incorporates the coincident index, and 
other variables that lead the economy (state-level housing permits, state initial unemployment 
insurance claims, delivery times from the Institute for Supply Management manufacturing survey, 
and the interest rate spread between the 10-year Treasury bond and the 3-month Treasury bill). Data 
are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
Table 10 
C&I Loanss,t C&I Loanss,t represents credit supplied in state s in year t and is defined as the change in total 
Commercial and Industrial (C&I) loans outstanding of commercial banks in a given state from the 
end of year t-1 to t. Data are obtained from bank-level Call Reports. 
Economic cyclet Economic cycle is defined using the NBER dates for economic expansions and contractions. The 
economic expansion phase includes the following time periods: 1993 – 2000, 2002 – 2007, and 
2010 – 2015. The economic contraction phase includes the years 2001, 2008 and 2009. Data on the 
dates are obtained from “US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions” page of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Housing price growths,t  Housing price growths,t is the growth in seasonally adjusted housing price index, calculated as 
(Housing Indexs,t - Housing Indexs,t-1) / Housing Indexs,t-1, where Housing Indexs,t is seasonally 
adjusted housing price index for state s, as of the last quarter of year t. Data are obtained from the 




Table 1 (cont) 
Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Table 11  
Entrenchments,t Entrenchments,t is defined as the aggregate entrenchment scores of firms headquartered in state s in 
year t. Entrenchment index (E index), as constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2008), measures the extent 
to which a firm has entrenching provisions. Specifically, each firm is given a score from 0 to 6 
based on the number of provisions that limit shareholder power - staggered boards, limits to 
shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements 
for mergers and charter amendments. The scores are aggregated across all firms headquartered in 
state s. High aggregate entrenchment is a sample of states with state-level score at or above the 
median. Low aggregate entrenchment is a sample of states with state-level score below the median. 
Data are available for the companies followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) from year 1990 to 2006. Data are obtained from Lucian Bebchuk's website. 
Social Capitals,t Social Capitals,t is calculated as the first principal component from a principal component analysis 
of four factors provided by the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NRCRD) at the 
Pennsylvania State University. The four factors are: Pvote (percentage of voters who voted in the 
last presidential election), Respn (response rate to the Census Bureau's decennial census), Nccs 
(number of non-profit organizations) and Assn (total number of social organizations). These 
components of social capital index at the county level are available for 1990, 1997, 2005, 2009 and 
2014. I first aggregate each of the four county-level factors to the state-level and linearly interpolate 
the data for the missing years. I then obtain the first principal component from a principal analysis 
of the four state-level factors. High social capital is a subsample of states with state-level social 
capital index at or above the median. Low social capital is a subsample of states with state-level 
social capital index below the median. 
Table 12  
Agg∆Corporate Activitys,t Agg∆Corporate Acticitys,t is defined as the aggregate proportionate changes in corporate activity of 
firms headquartered in state s, and is calculated as 
𝐴𝑔𝑔∆𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 , =  𝑤 , ,
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 , , − 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 , ,
|𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 , , |
 
where i indexes firm, s indexes headquarter state, t indexes year and N indexes the number of firms 
headquartered in state s. 𝑤 , ,  indexes weight computed using firm i’s market value of equity at the 
beginning of year t (see the definition of ∆Vegas,t above for the formula for 𝑤 , , ). Corporate 
Activity alternatively represents leverage (Lev), investment (Inv), net employment (Emp), R&D 
intensity (R&D), segment diversification (SegHHI), or acquisition related costs (Acq). 
Lev is calculated as (dlc+dltt) / at. Inv is calculated as capx / lagged ppent. Empi,s,t is calculated as  
emp – lagged emp. R&D is calculated as xrd/sale. Missing values for xrd are replaced with zero. 
SegHHI is calculated as the sum of squared segment sales (sales from Compustat's Segments file) 
divided by total firm sales (sale). Number of segments is set equal to one when segment data is not 
available from Compustat’s Segment file. Acq is calculated as aqc/lagged at. Missing values for 
aqc are replaced with zero. Data are obtained from Compustat. Segment data are obtained from 
Compustat’s Segments file. 
Table 13  
Skew_Vega (Delta)s,t Skew_Vega (Delta)s,t is defined as the skewness of the vegas (deltas) of firms headquartered in state 
s in year t, multiplied by -1. Data are obtained from Execucomp. 
Stddev_Vega (Delta)s,t Stddev_Vega(Delta)s,t, is defined as the standard deviation of the vegas (deltas) of firms 





Table 2: Sample composition 
This table reports sample composition. Panel A reports sample composition by state and Panel B reports sample 
composition by year. The sample begins with all firm-year observations at the intersection of Compustat and 
ExecuComp for the years between 1993 and 2015, with historical headquarter state information available (43,190 
firm-years). I eliminate firm-years for which the compensation data of at least five executives are not available in 
ExecuComp (4,058 firm-years). I eliminate executive-firm-years where vega and delta are zero or missing, and where 
the changes in vega and delta are at the 1 and 99 percentiles of the distribution. I further eliminate firm-years with 
missing data for Compustat variables. These screens result in 31,213 firm-years. Requiring each state-year to have 
data for at least two firms eliminates 88 firm-years. This step deletes two states - Alaska and Wyoming - from my 
sample. My final sample is an unbalanced panel of 1,005 state-years, covering 48 states for the 23-year period from 
1993 to 2015, and consists of 31,125 firm-year observations for 3,357 firm. 
 













Number of  
state-years 
AL 275 31 23 NC 594 60 23 
AR 261 20 23 ND 13 3 6 
AZ 372 49 23 NE 152 12 23 
CA 4,813 551 23 NH 78 12 16 
CO 471 68 23 NJ 1,149 126 23 
CT 893 99 23 NM 18 4 9 
DE 145 18 23 NV 246 31 23 
FL 963 114 23 NY 2,660 285 23 
GA 889 95 23 OH 1,533 135 23 
HI 84 6 23 OK 232 25 23 
IA 184 18 23 OR 324 29 23 
ID 122 12 23 PA 1,487 154 23 
IL 1,914 199 23 RI 103 8 23 
IN 393 41 23 SC 153 16 23 
KS 112 16 23 SD 43 5 19 
KY 222 22 23 TN 606 61 23 
LA 273 25 23 TX 2,835 322 23 
MA 1,428 154 23 UT 192 21 23 
MD 417 56 23 VA 829 96 23 
ME 26 4 12 VT 31 5 13 
MI 664 62 23 WA 516 53 23 
MN 990 90 23 WI 642 54 23 
MO 679 70 23 WV 31 5 10 
MS 62 13 21     
MT 6 2 3 Total 31,125 3,357 1,005 
        
Panel B: Sample composition by year 
Year  









1993  938 41 2005  1,472 44 
1994  1,254 44 2006  1,384 44 
1995  1,286 44 2007  1,409 42 
1996  1,328 44 2008  1,398 44 
1997  1,362 44 2009  1,404 44 
1998  1,437 46 2010  1,445 45 
1999  1,466 44 2011  1,390 44 
2000  1,415 44 2012  1,325 43 
2001  1,423 45 2013  1,249 41 
2002  1,448 44 2014  1,193 42 
2003  1,480 44 2015  1,067 42 





Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A reports summary statistics and panel B reports Pearson 
(below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations. The sample consists of 1,005 state-years from 1993 to 
2015. Correlation coefficients in bold indicate significance at or below the 5% level. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions and detailed description of their construction. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variables N Mean Std.Dev 25th 50th 75th 
∆CIndexs,t 1,005 0.026 0.027 0.016 0.030 0.042 
∆Vegas,t 1,005 0.306 0.393 0.071 0.227 0.425 
∆Deltas,t 1,005 0.261 0.362 0.046 0.214 0.445 
∆State Taxs,t 1,005 0.001 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 
∆Personal Incomes,t 1,005 0.048 0.028 0.033 0.050 0.064 
∆Housing Indexs,t 1,005 0.036 0.055 0.008 0.038 0.063 
       
Panel B: Pearson-Spearman correlations 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) ∆CIndexs,t  -0.136 0.117 -0.057 0.324 0.239 
(2) ∆Vegas,t -0.142  0.297 0.012 0.028 0.080 
(3) ∆Deltas,t 0.140 0.338  0.031 -0.036 0.054 
(4) ∆State Taxs,t -0.033 0.016 0.042  -0.057 -0.023 
(5) ∆Personal Incomes,t 0.419 0.024 -0.081 -0.048  0.270 






























Table 4: Aggregate vega and future state coincident index growth 
This table reports a regression of growth in state coincident index on aggregate vega. Column (1) estimates the effect 
of aggregate vega, not controlling for aggregate delta. Column (2) estimates the effect of aggregate vega after 
controlling for aggregate delta. See Table 1 for variable definitions and detailed description of their construction. 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The model includes state- and year- fixed effects 
and standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), 
respectively.  
 
Dep Var ∆ CIndexs,t+1 
 (1) (2) 
∆Vegas,t -0.0022 -0.0042*** 
    (-1.57)    (-2.87) 
∆Deltas,t  0.0059*** 
      (2.96) 
∆CIndexs,t 0.1309** 0.1198* 
     (2.13)     (1.99) 
∆State Taxs,t -0.0030 -0.0034 
    (-0.78)    (-0.97) 
∆Personal Incomes,t 0.0410 0.0391 
     (0.95)     (0.93) 
∆Housing Indexs,t 0.0285 0.0295 
     (1.47)     (1.58) 
State FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,005 1,005 



























Table 5: Robustness test - Alternative measures of aggregate vega 
This table reports regressions of growth in state coincident index on alternative measures of aggregate vega. Panel A 
reports the descriptive statistics of the alternative measures of aggregate vega. Panel B reports estimation results. 
Column (1) decomposes the aggregate change in vega into two parts - Current vegas,t and Manager-driven vegas,t. 
Column (2) uses growth in vega of nonfinancial firms only (SIC codes other than 6000-6999). See Table 1 for variable 
definitions and detailed description of their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in 
parentheses. All models include state- and year- fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Alt.Vega measures,t N Mean Std 25th 50th 75th 
Current vegas,t($10,000s) 993 3.201 2.160 1.418 2.765 4.634 
Manager-driven vegas,t($10,000s) 993 -1.061 1.615 -1.885 -0.704 -0.061 
∆Vegas,t(Nonfinancial firms) 997 0.290 0.366 0.065 0.221 0.424 
 
Panel B: Alternative measures of aggregate risk-taking incentives 
Dep Var ∆ CIndexs,t+1 
 (1)  (2) 
 Decomposed  Nonfinancial 
Current vegas,t -0.0016**   
    (-2.27)   
Manager-driven vegas,t 0.0005   
    (0.11)   
∆Vega(Nonfinancial)s,t   -0.0040** 
      (-2.52) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
State FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 993  997 






















Table 6: Robustness test - Future aggregate profitability 
This table reports regressions of future aggregate profitability on aggregate vega. Panel A reports the descriptive 
statistics of the aggregate profitability measures. Panel B reports estimation results. Column (1) uses aggregate growth 
in return-on-assets as the dependent variable. Column (2) uses aggregate market-adjusted returns as the dependent 
variable. See Table 1 for variable definitions and detailed description of their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust 
t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All models include state- and year- fixed effects and standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively.   
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  N Mean Std 25th 50th 75th 
Agg∆ROAs,t+1 1,005 0.021 0.322 -0.159 0.029 0.226 
AggRETs,t+1 1,005 0.013 0.104 -0.054 0.009 0.074 
 
Panel B: Future aggregate profitability 
 (1)  (2) 
Dep Var Agg∆ROAs,t+1  AggRETs,t+1  
∆Vegas,t -0.0996***  -0.0206** 
    (-3.79)     (-2.14) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
State FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,005  1,005 


















Table 7: Robustness test - Geographic dispersion 
This table tests the robustness of the baseline results to geographic dispersion of firms’ operations. Geographic 
dispersion data are obtained from Garcia and Norli (2012). A firm’s geographic dispersion (dispersion) is measured 
as the number of different states mentioned in sections “Item 1: Business”, “Item 2: Properties”, “Item 6: Consolidated 
Financial Data”, and “Item 7: Management’s Discussion and Analysis” of the 10-K filing. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics. Panel B reports estimation results. Column (1) estimates the baseline regression after removing firms with 
high geographic dispersion (firms with dispersion greater than twenty-five). Column (2) estimates the baseline 
regression incorporating geographic dispersion into the weight calculation used for aggregating firm-level vegas to 
the state-level. The geographic dispersion data are available for the years between 1994 and 2008. I use the 1993 and 
2008 dispersion data to approximate geographic dispersion for year 1993 and the years after 2008, respectively. See 
Table 1 for variable definitions and detailed description of their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. All models include control variables, and state- and year- fixed effects and standard errors 
are clustered at the state level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  N Mean Std 25th 50th 75th 
∆Vega_geofocuseds,t 1,005 0.269 0.367 0.043 0.191 0.389 
∆Vega_wgeofocuseds,t 1,005 0.303 0.348 0.089 0.236 0.439 
 
Panel B: Geographic dispersion 
Dep Var ∆ CIndexs,t+1 
 (1)  (2) 
∆Vega_geofocuseds,t -0.0047***   
    (-2.76)   
∆Vega_wgeofocuseds,t   -0.0045** 
        (-2.45) 
Control variables Yes  Yes 
State FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,005  1,005 



















Table 8: Robustness test - Instrumental variables regression 
This table tests the robustness of the baseline results, using instrument variables (IV) estimation. Column (1) reports 
the results of the first-stage estimation. Column (2) reports the results of the second-stage estimation, where growth 
in state coincident index is regressed on the instrumented measure of aggregate vega (∆InstVegas,t). See Table 1 for 
variable definitions and detailed description of their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust z-statistics are presented 
in parentheses. All models include state- and year- fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, 
** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively. ᵃ denotes the p-value for the Kleibergen-
Paap LM under-identification test statistic. ᵇ denotes the Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical value at the 10% 
significance level. ᶜ denotes the p-value for the Hansen J overidentification test statistic. 
 
Dep Var ∆Vegas,t  ∆ CIndexs,t+1 
 (1)  (2) 
∆Religiositys,t -3.4380***   
        (-5.89)   
DW∆Vega_others,t -27.8252***   
      (-18.32)   
∆InstVegas,t   -0.0031* 
         (-1.84) 
∆Deltas,t 0.1576***  0.0054*** 
         (5.15)         (2.70) 
∆CIndexs,t -0.3511  0.1213** 
        (-0.95)         (2.03) 
∆State Taxs,t 0.0191  -0.0035 
         (0.35)        (-1.01) 
∆Personal Incomes,t -0.5805  0.0399 
        (-1.42)         (0.97) 
∆Housing Indexs,t 0.9407***  0.0286 
         (3.64)         (1.61) 
State FE Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 26.96(0.000) ᵃ   
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 205.78(19.93) ᵇ   
Hansen J-statistic   0.657(0.418) ᶜ 
Observations 1,005  1,005 













Table 9: Robustness test - Controlling for forecasted economic growth 
This table reports a regression of growth in state coincident index on vega after controlling for forecasted growth in 
coincident index (Leading Index). See Table 1 for variable definitions and detailed description of their construction. 
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The model includes state- and year- fixed effects 
and standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), 
respectively.  
 
Dep Var ∆ CIndexs,t+1 
∆Vegas,t -0.0039*** 
     (-3.11) 
∆Deltas,t 0.0040** 
      (2.65) 
∆CIndexs,t -0.5080*** 
     (-6.39) 
∆State Taxs,t -0.0053* 
      (-1.98) 
∆Personal Incomes,t 0.0071 
      (0.20) 
∆Housing Indexs,t 0.0186 
      (1.07) 
Leading Indexs,t 2.0075*** 
      (8.71) 
State FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Observations 1,005 




Table 10: The role of credit supply and economic cycle 
This table reports regressions of growth in state coincident index on aggregate vega for subsamples partitioned on three conditioning variables: phase in economic 
cycle, state-level credit supply, and growth in housing price. Expansion and contraction phases are defined using the NBER dates for expansions and contractions. 
State-level credit supply is calculated as the change in the aggregate amount of the call report item “Commercial and Industrial Loans” (C&I loans) of commercial 
banks in a given state from the beginning to the end of t-1. The growth in housing price is measured as the growth in the housing price index obtained from the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency from the beginning to the end of t-1.  Column (1) presents the results for the expansion years (1993 – 2000, 2002-2007, 2010 – 
2015) and column (2) presents the results for the contraction years (2001, 2008 and 2009). In column (3) I use a subsample of states with relatively high change in 
C&I loan amounts from year t-1 to year t (at or above median change in aggregate C&I loans). In column (4) I use a subsample of states with relatively low change 
in C&I loan amounts from year t-1 to year t (below median change in aggregate C&I loans). In column (5) I use a subsample of states with relatively large growth 
in housing price from year t-1 to year t (at or above median growth in state housing price index). In column (6) I use a subsample of states with relatively small 
growth in housing price index from year t-1 to year t (below median growth in state housing price index). See Table 1 for variable definitions and detailed description 
of their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All models include state- and year- fixed effects and standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. *,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively. The p-value for the test of equal coefficient on ∆Vegas,t 
is one-sided.  
 
Dep Var ∆ CIndexs,t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









∆Vegas,t -0.0042** 0.0042 -0.0072** -0.0022 -0.0061** -0.0028 
      (-2.55)        (0.56)      (-2.53)        (-1.22)        (-2.45)        (-1.09) 
∆Deltas,t 0.0055** 0.0021 0.0098*** 0.0038* 0.0082*** 0.0058** 
      (2.60)        (0.20)      (3.28)        (1.78)         (2.81)         (2.10) 
∆CIndexs,t 0.1404* -0.1071 0.0542 0.1540* -0.0062 0.2049** 
      (2.00)        (-0.45)      (0.58)        (1.94)        (-0.08)         (2.09) 
∆State Taxs,t -0.0027 0.0381 -0.0031 -0.0040 -0.0071 -0.0030 
      (-0.72)        (0.66)      (-0.21)        (-0.92)        (-0.35)        (-0.86) 
∆Personal Incomes,t 0.0456 0.1005 0.0510 -0.0201 0.0719 -0.0174 
      (1.14)        (0.42)      (1.01)        (-0.28)         (1.09)        (-0.26) 
∆Housing Indexs,t 0.0273 0.1018 0.0616 0.0204 -0.0226 0.1049 
      (1.52)        (1.08)      (2.10)        (0.77)        (-0.74)         (1.54) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
|Diff| > 0 p-value 0.083 0.054 0.125 
Observations 872 133 482 523 499 506 




Table 11: The role of corporate governance and social capital 
This table reports regressions of growth in state coincident index on aggregate vega for subsamples. The sample is 
partitioned on two conditioning variables: aggregate entrenchment score and social capital. The partitioning variables 
are measured at the end of t-1. In column (1) I use a subsample of states where firms headquartered in the state are 
more entrenched (aggregated entrenchment score at or above the median). In column (2) I use a subsample of states 
where firms headquartered in the state are less entrenched (aggregated entrenchment score below the median). In 
column (3) I use a subsample of states with high social capital (state-level social index at or above the median). In 
column (4) I use a subsample of states with low social capital (state-level social index below the median). See Table 
1 for variable definitions and detailed description of their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. All models include state- and year- fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively. The p-value for the test of equal 
coefficient on ∆Vegas,t is one-sided.  
 
Dep Var ∆ CIndexs,t+1 










∆Vegas,t -0.0071*** -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0060*** 
           (-3.12)         (-0.59)         (-0.51)         (-2.82) 
∆Deltas,t 0.0052** 0.0058 0.0021 0.0082** 
            (2.08)          (1.69)          (0.88)          (2.58) 
∆CIndexs,t -0.0399 -0.0864 0.1220 0.1074 
           (-0.53)         (-1.24)          (1.63)          (1.12) 
∆State Taxs,t -0.0072*** 0.0079 -0.0032 -0.0228 
           (-3.10)          (0.44)         (-0.86)         (-1.08) 
∆Personal Incomes,t -0.0037 -0.0025 0.0805 -0.0154 
           (-0.06)         (-0.04)          (1.48)         (-0.23) 
∆Housing Indexs,t 0.0588 0.0212 0.0101 0.0540** 
            (1.24)          (1.06)          (0.33)          (2.13) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
|Diff| > 0 p-value 0.050 0.054 
Observations 308 310 482 523 







Table 12: Aggregate corporate activities 
This table examines aggregate corporate activities. Panel A reports descriptive statistics. Panel B reports regressions of aggregate corporate activities on aggregate 
vega. This table reports the results of the mediation analysis, using structural equation modeling. See Table 1 for variable definitions and detailed description of 
their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. All models include control variables, and state- and year- fixed effects and 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  N Mean Std 25th 50th 75th 
Agg∆Levs,t 1,005 0.080 0.136 -0.018 0.054 0.160 
Agg∆Invs,t 1,005 0.074 0.249 -0.059 0.043 0.161 
Agg∆Emps,t 1,005 -0.332 4.507 -1.303 -0.436 0.451 
Agg∆RDs,t 1,005 0.005 0.024 -0.009 0.000 0.018 
Agg∆SegHHIs,t 1,005 0.018 0.075 -0.001 0.000 0.006 
 
Panel B: Aggregate corporate policies   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep Var Agg∆Levs,t+1 Agg∆Invs,t+1 Agg∆Emps,t+1 Agg∆RDs,t+1 Agg∆SegHHIs,t+1 
∆Vegas,t 0.0335*** -0.0516** -0.8335* 0.0086*** 0.0145* 
          (3.00)       (-2.43)         (-1.75)          (3.35)         (1.84) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 




Table 13: Skewness and dispersion of firm-level managerial incentives 
This table reports regressions of growth in state coincident index on the skewness and the dispersion of the 
distributions of vega and delta of firms headquartered in state s. Skew_Vega (Delta)s,t is defined as the skewness of the vegas 
(deltas) of firms headquartered in state s in year t, multiplied by -1. Stddev_Vega(Delta)s,t, is defined as the standard deviation of 
the vegas (deltas) of firms headquartered in state s in year t. See Table 1 for variable definitions and detailed description of 
their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The model includes state- and 
year- fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% (two-sided), respectively.  
 
Dep Var ∆ CIndexs,t+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Skewness Dispersion 
∆Vegas,t  -0.0048*  -0.0052** 
         (-1.92)         (-2.43) 
∆Deltas,t  0.0085***  0.0115*** 
          (3.07)          (3.49) 
Skew_∆Vegas,t 0.0002 0.0002   
           (0.38)         (0.45)   
Skew_∆Deltas,t 0.0014** 0.0012**   
           (2.57)         (2.25)   
∆Vegas,t ×Skew_∆Vegas,t  -0.0007   
         (-0.72)   
∆Deltas,t ×Skew_∆Deltas,t  0.0007   
          (0.52)   
Stddev_∆Vegas,t   0.0001 0.0018 
           (0.07)         (0.76) 
Stddev_∆Deltas,t   0.0015 0.0025 
           (0.71)         (1.16) 
∆Vegas,t ×Stddev_∆Vegas,t    0.0002 
            (0.13) 
∆Deltas,t ×Stddev_∆Deltas,t    -0.0062** 
           (-2.67) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 941 941 1,005 523 












Table 14: Regressing future aggregate vega and aggregate delta on economic variables 
This table reports regressions of future aggregate vega and delta changes on current economic variables. See Table 1 
for variable definitions and detailed description of their construction. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. The model includes state- and year- fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the 
state level. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
Dep Var ∆Vegas,t+1 ∆Deltas,t+1 
∆Vegas,t -0.0340 -0.0682 
    (-0.57)    (-1.65) 
∆Deltas,t 0.0356 -0.0444 
     (0.47)     (-0.82) 
∆CIndexs,t -0.7905 -0.8813 
     (-1.05)     (-1.54) 
∆State Taxs,t 0.1116 0.0394 
     (1.09)     (0.30) 
∆Personal Incomes,t 1.2482 0.1505 
     (1.07)     (0.19) 
∆Housing Indexs,t 0.3461 0.0432 
     (1.15)     (0.17) 
State FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,003 1,003 
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